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Abstract
This paper reports the results of a series of field experiments designed to investigate how
peer effects operate in a real work setting. Workers were hired from an online labor mar-
ket to perform an image-labeling task and, in some cases, to evaluate the work product of
other workers. These evaluations had financial consequences for both the evaluating worker
and the evaluated worker. The experiments showed that on average, evaluating high-output
work raised an evaluator’s subsequent productivity, with larger effects for evaluators that are
themselves highly productive. The content of the subject evaluations themselves suggest one
mechanism for peer effects: workers readily punished other workers whose work product exhib-
ited low output/effort. However, non-compliance with employer expectations did not, by itself,
trigger punishment: workers would not punish non-complying workers so long as the evaluated
worker still exhibited high effort. A worker’s willingness to punish was strongly correlated
with their own productivity, yet this relationship was not the result of innate differences—
productivity-reducing manipulations also resulted in reduced punishment. Peer effects proved
hard to stamp out: although most workers complied with clearly communicated maximum
expectations for output, some workers still raised their production beyond the output ceiling
after evaluating highly productive yet non-complying work products.
JEL J01, J24, J3
1 Introduction
A perennial question of interest to both economists and firm managers alike is why employees
work hard despite facing weak incentives and light monitoring. Many theories have been proposed:
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firms might obtain high effort via explicit contracts (Holmstrom, 1982), relational contracts (Levin,
2003) or efficiency wages (Katz, 1986). In each of these theories, the explanation hinges upon the
relationship between the firm and the individual worker—a worker’s co-workers or “peers,” if they
matter at all, are relevant only to the extent that they influence the incentives offered by the firm
(e.g., by influencing payoffs in a relative performance scheme). However, recent empirical research
has highlighted the direct effects that co-workers can have on each others productivity without
intermediation by the firm.1 There are several potential channels through which these workplace
peer effects could flow: peers could offer instruction about how to be more productive, threaten
punishment, promise rewards, offer examples of relevant norms or spur competition. The purpose
of this paper is to help clarify these potential mechanisms through experimentation in a real work
setting.
1.1 Overview of experiments and findings
This paper reports the results of five closely related field experiments designed to explore the rela-
tionships among a worker’s peers, the policies and statements of the firm and a worker’s productivity.
Table 1 provides an overview of each experimental design and the results. In each experiment, work-
ers from an online labor market were hired to produce descriptive labels for photographic images.2
In each experiment, all subjects labeled the exact same image which makes output comparisons
across experimental groups meaningful. Before joining the experiment, would-be workers read a
description of the task, learned the payment and viewed a work sample (i.e., a screen shot of the
image-labeling interface with some number of labels completed). If they chose to participate, they
labeled one or more images, depending on the details of the experiment. A worker’s output was
simply the number of labels they produced. Because subjects were not informed they were partic-
ipating in experiments, the experiments were “natural” field experiments in the Harrison and List
(2004) taxonomy.
In Experiment A, subjects were randomly assigned to view either a high-output work sample
(with many labels for an image) or a low-output work sample (with only a few labels for that
same image). All subjects then performed an image-labeling task. All subjects labeled the same
image, making cross-group output comparisons meaningful. Exposure to the high-output work
sample lowered labor supply on the extensive margin but raised it on the intensive margin. These
two results are important for follow-on experiments, because they imply that (1) subjects regarded
effort as costly and (2) subjects held the work sample as informative about employer expectations.
In Experiment B, all subjects viewed the same low-output work sample from Experiment A and
then completed an image-labeling task. After completing this task, subjects evaluated the work
of another worker. The evaluated work displayed either high- or low-output, and subjects were
randomly assigned to the work they evaluated. Evaluation had two parts: each subject was asked
to recommend whether or not the firm should “approve” the evaluated work as well as how to split a
bonus with the evaluated worker. The bonus split question created a contextualized dictator game.
The “approve” question has a technical and consequential meaning in the market—when work is
not approved, the worker submitting that work does not get paid and their reputation suffers.3
1See, for example, Bandiera et al. (2010), Mas and Moretti (2009), Falk and Ichino (2006), and Guryan et al.
(2009).
2For example, a photograph of a breakfast scene might generate the labels “juice, toast, cereal.”
3A worker’s reputation in this market is simply the percentage of their submissions that get approved. Buyers
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Evaluating low-output work led to greater punishment: subjects viewing low-output work were far
more likely to recommend rejection and granted smaller bonuses. Regardless of group assignment,
highly productive subjects (as measured by their output on the initial task) were harsher judges;
compared to their low-productivity peers, they were more likely to recommend rejection and they
granted smaller bonuses.
All subjects in Experiment C were first shown a low productivity work sample. Subjects then
performed an image-labeling task. After completing the task, subjects next evaluated the work
product of another worker. Unlike in Experiment B, all subjects in C evaluated the same work. The
only experimental manipulation in Experiment C occurred during the image-labeling phase: subjects
were randomly assigned to either a normal image-labeling interface or to a special image-labeling
interface that generated a pop-up notice after subjects added their second label. This pop-up notice
was designed to modify subjects’ beliefs about employer expectations. The purpose of the notice
was to reduce output without inducing a change in extensive labor supply.4 By changing output
without changing the composition of subjects (i.e., no supply effects on the extensive margin), it was
possible to test the “innate types” explanation for the strong relationship between productivity and
punishment found in Experiment B. In this experiment, I found no evidence that highly productive
workers are simply more punishment prone: workers receiving the pop-up notice reduced their
output, decreased their rejection recommendations and increased their bonuses.
In Experiment D, all subjects were first shown a low productivity work sample. Next, they
performed an initial image labeling task and then were randomly assigned to evaluate either high-
or low-output work. After this evaluating, subjects performed an additional image-labeling task.
On average, workers that evaluated highly productive work produced more labels in the follow-on
image-labeling task than workers that evaluated less productive work. These effects on productivity
were strong and easily detectable, but they were not homogeneous: less productive workers were
far less susceptible to the effects, contra to some findings that peer effects raise the output of low
productivity workers (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009).
In Experiment E all subjects were shown a work sample with exactly 2 labels and were told
that they should produce only 2 labels. After performing an initial image-labeling task, subjects
evaluated work that contained either 2 or 11 labels. Workers did not treat the high-effort but
non-complying work as worthy of punishment: subjects were just as likely to recommend approval
of the 11 label work and granted slightly larger bonus payments. Despite the explicit statements
of employer expectations, exposure to the high-output/non-complying work had the same effect
as exposure to high-output work in Experiment D: exposed workers raised output, in many cases
beyond the clearly communicated ceiling. However, most workers complied with the standard
initially, and exposure to complying work seemed to further increase compliance.
1.2 Implications
One explanation for the results across the five experiments is that workers were uncertain about what
constituted an appropriate amount of output and they use observations from employer-provided
work samples and the output of peers to determine that amount. Because workers find labeling
can put approval percentage screening criteria on their tasks, e.g., only allow workers with a 95% approval rate to
complete this task.
4Because the pop-up notice appeared after a subject had already decided to provide a positive amount of labor,
it had no effect on the extensive margin.
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costly, these beliefs about employer expectations serve as a constraint in the implicit optimization
problem faced by workers.
Learning about employer expectations results in changes not only in a worker’s labor supply, but
also in their willingness to punish or reward their peers. As this learning can come from multiple
sources, perceived employer expectations do not fall wholly under any single entity’s control and
can evolve as workers work, observe, and are observed.
Punishment seems to come easily to many workers. The reasons why workers punish is unclear,
but there are several possible theoretical explanations. Perhaps the simplest is that workers view
themselves as a monitored agent of the employer, and they make decisions about acceptance and
bonuses according to what they believe will satisfy the principal. However, workers do not appear
to be general-purpose enforcers of employers’ requests—workers punish low effort. Non-complying
but high effort work is treated no differently vis-a`-vis punishment than complying work. The fact
that workers only appear willing to punish low effort places a constraint on how firms can make use
of worker-driven norm enforcement. For example, it may be difficult to get workers to substitute
easy, correct procedures for difficult, inefficient procedures. Ironically, the difficulty itself might
make an outdated procedure harder to replace, as workers who adopt the easier method might be
perceived to be shirking.
The finding that exposure to low-output work lowers output, combined with the finding that
low-productivity reduces willingness to punish, suggests the possibility of an organizational vicious
cycle: after observing idiosyncratically bad work, workers may lower their own output and punish
less in response, in turn reducing other workers’ incentives to be highly productive. This may explain
why organizational leaders often use the language of contagion to describe morale and so much of
management theory focuses on understanding and influencing organizational culture (Schein, 2004),
rather than, for example, trying to write perfectly complete employment contracts.
1.3 Related work
Several recent papers examine the effects of peers on workplace productivity. Perhaps the most
illuminating observational evidence comes from Mas and Moretti (2009), who showed that less pro-
ductive grocery clerks exhibited greater productivity when working near highly productive clerks,
but only when they were in the direct view of the highly productive clerks. This finding suggests
that the threat of punishment might partially explain workplace peer effects. There is much labo-
ratory literature supporting this punishment-as-peer-effect view, with several studies showing that
workers will readily bear costs and altruistically punish peers that free-ride in public goods games
(Fehr and Gachter, 2002, 2000). This “strong reciprocity” (Carpenter et al., 2009) is a powerful
peer effect, and although firms are not perfectly analogous to public goods games, the notion of
worker-enforced productivity norms offers a very general potential solution to the incentive problem
of team production.
Guryan, et al. (2009) also use evidence from a real workplace, albeit an unusual one: they
exploited the random assignment of professional golfers to tournament foursomes to estimate the
effects of each player’s peers on the player’s own performance. In contrast to Mas and Moretti,
Guryan, et al. found no evidence of peer effects, providing a useful corrective to hasty or overly
broad generalizations. However, professional golf tournaments are unusual work environments, in
that two common channels for peer effects are foreclosed: professional golfers know what constitutes
good performance and are unlikely to raise their quality of play in the “shadow” of punishment that
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might be meted out for non-compliance with productivity norms. In marked contrast with the Mas
and Moretti setting, shirking by a professional golfer imposes a positive externality on “co-workers.”
Using a field experiment, Falk and Ichino (2006) showed that workers stuffing envelopes in pairs
had less variation in their output levels than synthetically “paired” workers constructed from an
experimental group whose members worked alone. While they cannot estimate the direction of peer
effects (i.e., low productivity affects or is affected by high productivity, or some amalgamation of
effects), their analysis of the output distribution led them to conclude that it was more likely that
less productive workers were made more productive by working in pairs.
The difference between the Guryan, et al. setting, the Falk and Ichino setting and that of
Mas and Moretti—and the resultant difference in findings—serves as a justification for the present
study, which has an unusual but highly controllable work context that preserves some of the common
features of work environments, including uncertainty about norms, costly effort and a task unlikely
to inspire much intrinsic motivation. Unlike the Mas and Moretti setting, however, there are no
overt free-riding externalities (in the check-out line, slacking by one clerk increases the work load
of other clerks). The absence of direct negative externalities is important, as evidence from such a
setting can provide some sense of how general punishment might operate in the workplace.
1.4 Contribution
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on workplace peer effects. It provides credible
evidence of the existence and operation of peer effects on productivity, which is especially useful
given the lack of concordance between some of the major results in the field and the inherent
difficulty of estimating these kinds of effects (Manski, 1993). This evidence is particularly useful
because the scope of possible interpretations is limited, due to the narrow channel through which
peer effects could operate. Observation of work output was the only “interaction” and the payment
scheme was not relative. The punishment component provides additional insight into the shadow
cast by peer-based norm enforcement.
One methodological advance of this paper is that productivity is measured both before and
after exposure to peers. By base-lining prior output, the conditional nature of peer effects becomes
apparent. For example, I find that the conditional treatment effects of exposure to low quality peers
differ from the effects found by Falk and Ichino. They found that “bad apples far from damaging
good apples seem instead to gain in quality when paired with the latter.” Mas and Moretti find a
similar result. In the setting examined here, the traditional bad apples metaphor applied—the bad
apples ruined the good apples, and the good apples did nothing for the bad.
2 Methods and Materials
Before describing the experiment results, I first describe the marketplace where the experiments
were conducted, the methodological issues involved in online experimentation and the actual task
completed by workers and interface used. The experiments were conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk), an online labor market where workers are available to complete small tasks for
payment. Background information on MTurk closely follows Horton and Chilton (2010). MTurk is
one of several online labor markets that have emerged in recent years (Frei, 2009). At present, it is
the most amenable to online experimentation.
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Table 1: Details of the Experiments
Exp. Question Set-up Treatment Control Result
A Can employers convey pro-
ductivity expectations?
Subjects viewed an employer-provided work
sample, then chose how many labels to pro-
duce (if any). Work samples differed by ex-
perimental group.
HIGH:Subjects
viewed high-
output work
sample (many
labels)
LOW: Subjects
viewed low-
output work
sample (few
labels)
HIGH increased labor sup-
ply on intensive margin,
but decreased it on exten-
sive margin
B Do workers punish workers
that exhibit low productiv-
ity?
Subjects viewed an employer-provided work
sample, then chose how many labels to
produce. Subjects then evaluated another
worker’s work product.
GOOD: Subjects
evaluated a high-
output work sam-
ple
BAD: Subjects
evaluated a low-
output work
sample
GOOD increased approval
recommendations and
bonus amounts. Highly
productive workers pun-
ished more with their
evaluations.
C Is the relationship between
own-productivity and pun-
ishment causal?
Subjects viewed an employer-provided work
sample, then chose how many labels to
produce. Subjects then evaluated another
worker’s work product.
CURB: Subjects
received a notice
after two labels
saying that 3 la-
bels was probably
enough output
NONE: Subjects
received no no-
tice.
Greatly reduced output in
CURB; those in CURB
more likely to recommend
approval and grant larger
bonuses
D Does exposure to low-
output work affect a
worker’s productivity?
Subjects viewed an employer-provided work
sample, then chose how many labels to
produce. Subjects then evaluated another
worker’s work product. Then they labeled
a second image.
GOOD: Subjects
evaluated a high-
output work sam-
ple
BAD: Subjects
evaluated a low-
output work
sample
GOOD raised output on
second task; effects were
stronger for more produc-
tive subjects (measured by
first task output).
E Are workers susceptible
to peer effects in pres-
ence of strongly-stated em-
ployer expectations? Do
they punish high-effort but
non-complying work?
Subjects viewed an employer-provided work
sample with 2 labels, then chose how many
labels to produce. Subjects were told that 2
and only 2 labels should be produced. Sub-
jects then evaluated another worker’s work
product, then labeled a second image.
OVER: Sub-
jects evaluated a
worker producing
too many labels
OK: Subjects
evaluated a
worker produc-
ing the required
number of labels
OVER increased sub-
sequent output beyond
ceiling, but did not cause
more punishment.
2.1 Online experimentation
In the past few years, researchers in a number of disciplines—with computer science leading the
way—have begun running experiments online using online labor markets.5 Some examples in eco-
nomics include Mason and Watts (2009), Chandler and Kapelner (2010) and Horton and Chilton
(2010). Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser (2010) argue that online experiments can offer a high degree
of both internal and external validity. Despite their advantages online experiments can also be
harder to control compared to conventional laboratory experiments. However, they are generally
easier to control than conventional field experiments. Because subjects may quit at any time, the
biggest threat to valid inference is non-random attrition. In Experiment A, quitting was actually
a useful outcome to observe, as the experiment focused on labor supply on both the intensive and
extensive margins. In the other four experiments, by design, essentially all attrition occurred before
subjects experienced any treatment-specific differences. For Experiments B-E, only subjects that
completed the initial image-labeling task were included in the sample (with others dropped), but
this creates no sampling bias, since all subjects made their initial output decisions before being
exposed to any experimental group-specific treatments.
2.2 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is an online labor market where workers are available to perform small
jobs called “Human Intelligence Tasks” (HITs) for buyers, who, in the parlance of MTurk, are
called “requesters.” HITs vary, but most are small, simple tasks that are difficult for computers but
relatively easy for humans to perform. Common tasks include transcribing audio clips, classifying
and tagging images, reviewing documents and checking websites for pornographic content. When
5For an overview of online labor markets, see Horton (2010a).
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posting a HIT, a requester describes the task, creates a user interface, establishes a piece-rate
payment, specifies worker qualifications, and sets the number of times each HIT may be performed.
In order to become an MTurk worker, a person must create an MTurk account and provide a
bank account number to Amazon. Workers are only allowed to have one account, and Amazon
uses several technical and legal means to enforce this restriction. Once they are members, workers
are able to observe the collection of HITs available to them and, in most cases, view a sample of
the required work. They can work on any task for which they are qualified and can begin work
immediately after accepting a HIT.
Once a worker completes a HIT, the work product is submitted to the requester for review. The
requester decides whether or not to “approve” it. If approved, the worker is paid the piece rate.
The worker is also paid if the requester does not review and approve the work within a specified
amount of time. Solely at their discretion, requesters may “reject” work, in which case the worker
is not paid. The ability of requesters to reject work creates consequences for providing work that
does not meet employer expectations—a feature critical to the experiments conducted. Requesters
may also elect to pay bonuses, which makes it easy to tailor payments to individual workers based
on their performance within a nominally piece-rate HIT.
MTurk workers appear to be split approximately evenly between the US and India. Most report
that they participate to earn money and generally view employers online as having the same level
of trustworthiness as offline, traditional employers (Horton, 2010b). For the demographics of the
MTurk population, see Ipeirotis (2010).
2.3 Task and interface
In each of the experiments, subjects were asked to label images. The images themselves were selected
from the photo sharing website Flickr.6 Image-labeling is a very common“human computation”task
because labels are needed to make images searchable, but computers do a poor job of identifying
objects in images (von Ahn and Dabbish, 2004; Huang et al., 2010). The interface itself was created
in Limesurvey, an open-source survey platform.7 In order to add labels, subjects had to click a
button labeled “Add a label.” A screen shot of the interface can be seen in Figure 1. Clicking the
button caused a new blank text field to be added to the survey. When they finished adding labels
subjects clicked a button labeled “Submit labels,” which saved within the survey all of the labels
generated and the time spent adding labels. No attempt was made to adjudicate the quality of
the labels—if the subject started to add another label, this was recorded as an additional unit of
output.
For the evaluation task, each subject viewed a screen shot of another worker’s work product.
As with the initial image-labeling task, the evaluation task (and the potential bonus) was likely
perceived as unextraordinary. On MTurk, it is very common to have workers evaluate the work of
other MTurk workers. A frequently used solution to the problem of spam submissions (which occur
often when buyers post many tasks—see Ipeirotis et al. (2010)) is to have workers vote on the work
product of other workers. It is also very common to use bonuses to motivate performance.
It is important to note that all the subjects in an experiment labeled the same image, regardless
of their group assignment. For example, in Experiment A, all subjects labeled an image showing
6The images each had a Creative Commons license and were chosen because they were conducive to labeling (e.g.,
photos depicting elaborate meals with many easily recognizable food types).
7The interface for adding labels was written in JavaScript as an add-on module to Limesurvey.
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a collection of mechanics tools. What varied across experimental groups were factors like the
provided work sample, work instructions or the demonstrated productivity of the worker they were
asked to evaluate. Because the images were the same across groups, output levels are comparable,
and differences in output can be attributed causally to whatever factor was manipulated in that
experiment.
2.4 Demographic survey
In each of the five experiments, subjects answered a short demographic survey before beginning
work. The survey was identical in each experiment. Subjects were asked to report their gender,
country (choices were US, India or some other country) and whether they use MTurk primarily in
order to make money, learn new skills or have fun. There were small differences in the reported
covariates across experiments, with most of the difference probably driven by differences in when
experiments were launched.
Although one might think the survey would rise suspicions that the task was an experiment,
I view this as unlikely. Asking workers for basic demographic information is fairly common in
the market, as requesters frequently use location and formal qualifications to screen workers. In
fact, place- and reputation-based screening is built into the system, making it even more likely
that workers view the demographic questions as an employer work-around to further expand the
ability to screen or algorithmically adjudicate response quality. With some noted exceptions, the
demographic information had little predictive power and only marginally improved the precision in
the regressions, so they were not included.
3 Experiment A: Perceived employer expectations
Experiment A investigates whether a “firm” in this market can influence employee expectations
about productivity. For the image labeling task, a simple way to convey expectations is to show a
work sample. In this experiment, workers were assigned to one of two experimental groups: HIGH ,
in which the work sample showed 9 labels, and LOW , in which the work sample showed 2 labels.8
The work samples are shown in Figure 1. After subjects viewed their assigned work sample, they
chose to either label an image or exit the experiment, forfeiting payment.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the experiment. The job posting explained that workers
would be asked to do a simple image-labeling task and would be paid 30 cents. The planned sample
size was 100. Subjects not completing the demographic survey (which occurred prior to group
assignment) were dropped from the sample. In this experiment and all subsequent experiments,
subjects were assigned to groups by stratifying on arrival time (e.g., subject 1 was assigned to
HIGH , subject 2 to LOW , subject 3 to HIGH and so on).
3.1 Results
The main results from the experiment are displayed in Figure 2, which shows histograms of output
for each experimental group. Mean output is indicated via a vertical line in each panel. Subjects in
8Throughout the paper, the experimental group names will be treated as indicator variables, i.e., HIGH = 1 is
synonymous with worker i being assigned to group HIGH .
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(a) HIGH (y = 9) (b) LOW (y = 2)
Figure 1: Work samples shown to workers prior to task acceptance in Experiment A.
HIGH produced absolutely more output. A sizable number of subjects in HIGH produced more
than 12 labels, but only 1 subject in LOW produced more than 12 labels. However, the greater
productivity in HIGH came at a cost: a larger fraction of subjects in HIGH elected not to produce
any output and quit.
3.1.1 High employer expectations reduced labor supply on the extensive margin
When we regress an indicator for any output at all on the treatment indicator, we have:9
1{y > 0} = −0.177
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.085]
·HIGH + 0.872
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.050]
(1)
with n = 93 and R2 = 0.05. Subjects assigned to HIGH were significantly less likely to accept the
task compared to subjects in LOW .
3.1.2 High employer expectations increased labor supply on the intensive margin
Despite the much greater number of subjects in HIGH who chose not to participate (and thus
provided 0 labels), output was unconditionally higher in HIGH than in LOW . Even with the
non-participants included as y = 0 observations, subjects in HIGH produced, on average, roughly
2 more labels per person:
y = 1.970
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.956]
·HIGH + 2.638
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.430]
(2)
with n = 93 and R2 = 0.05.
9Standard errors are robust and shown under the coefficient.
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Figure 2: Histogram of labels produced by experimental group in Experiment A. The solid vertical
line indicates the mean, while the shaded band around that line is 2 standard errors wide. Subjects
in the HIGH group were shown a work sample consisting of 9 labels prior to performing, while
subjects in LOW were shown a work sample with only 2 labels. The right edge of each bar intersects
the x-axis at the corresponding member of the support, i.e., the largest output choice in the HIGH
panel is y = 20. This plot and all plots in the document were made using the open source R package
ggplot2 (Wickham, 2008).
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Table 2: Experiment A summary statistics (n = 93)
Administrative
Launch: Fri Apr 09 21:10:31 GMT 2010
Finish: Sun Apr 11 10:04:40 GMT 2010
Survey FALSE TRUE % TRUE
male 39 54 58.1
from India 48 45 48.4
from US 58 35 37.6
motivated by money 22 71 76.3
Treatment Assignment
HIGH = 1 47 46 49.5
Output Min .25 Med. Mean .75 Max
Labels produced (y)
in HIGH 0 0 1 4.609 8.5 20
in LOW 0 1 2 2.638 3 13
Entry (y > 0)
in HIGH 0 0 1 0.6957 1 1
in LOW 0 1 1 0.8723 1 1
Time spent on task (seconds)
in HIGH 9.157 53.27 98.13 172.9 225.4 715.5
in LOW 9.563 28.61 54.9 94.85 110.4 904.3
The key result from Experiment A can be seen in the differences in group means in the “Labels
produced” and the “Entry” rows.
3.2 Discussion
Experiment A suggests that workers use the work sample to infer how much work will be required to
meet the employer’s expectations and thus obtain payment. Given that buyers can reject submitted
work, the labor supply results are consistent with workers viewing label creation as costly. Some of
the subjects decided that the costs of meeting the perceived requirements for the HIGH group were
too high and chose to exit. Those subjects that stayed worked to the higher perceived standard
and completed the task. The increase in output in HIGH was the result of some combination of
selection and greater effort. Because unconditional output rose significantly in HIGH , we know
that selection alone cannot explain the increase in output.
The results highlight the trade-off firms might face when communicating standards to employees.
Claiming to have high standards may be counterproductive, depending on the nature of the firm’s
demand for labor. In our particular image-labeling application, conveying high standards via the
highly productive work sample was efficient only if the goal was to minimize the per-label price, but
it is easy to imagine scenarios where this is not the objective. For tasks like image-labeling, obtaining
a large and diverse pool of workers—each contributing a relatively small amount of outut—may be
more useful than obtaining lots of output from small number of workers , in which case the high
standards conveyed to HIGH would have been undesirable.
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4 Experiment B: Punishment and peer output
Experiment B investigated the conditions under which workers reward or punish their fellow workers
on the basis of their co-workers output. Subjects in the Experiment first completed an image-labeling
task and then were randomly assigned to either the GOOD or the BAD experimental group. The
GOOD subjects inspected the output of a worker from Experiment A that produced 12 unique
labels while BAD subjects inspected the output of a worker that produced only 1 unique label.
The output samples of the evaluated workers are shown in Figure 3. Subjects were then asked to
(1) give a recommendation as to whether or not the work inspected should be approved and (2)
decide how to split a 9 cent bonus with the evaluated worker. Specifically, subjects were asked,
“Should we approve this work?” and had to answer “yes” or “no.” Both questions were asked on the
same survey page, and subjects could answer them in either order, though the approval question was
first on the page. In the regressions that follow, approve = 1 indicates that a subject recommended
approval. For the contextualized dictator game, subjects were told:
“We want to determine how good this work is. We would like you to decide, based on
your work and the quality of the other work, how to split a 9 cent bonus.”
Subjects selected an answer from a list of 9 options of the form “X cents for them, 9−X cents for
me,” with X ranging from 0 to 9 (9 cents was chosen as the endowment to reduce the salience of the
focal point 50-50 split). At the end of the experiment, we implemented all choices, with bonuses
paid to the evaluating subjects and to the two lucky subjects responsible for the GOOD and BAD
evaluated work samples. In the regressions that follow, the amount transferred to the evaluated
subject is represented by bonus, with bonus ∈ [0, 9].
The MTurk job posting for Experiment B was nearly identical to the posting for Experiment A,
except that potential subjects were told that they would be evaluating the work of another worker.
Before accepting the task, all subjects were shown the HIGH work sample used in Experiment A.
Because of the additional evaluation work, the participation payment was raised from 30 cents to 40
cents. The requested sample size was also increased to 200. Table 3 reports the summary statistics
for Experiment B.
4.1 Results
The results from Experiment B can be seen in Figure 4, which contains 4 histograms, each showing
the allocation of the 9-cent bonus. The plots are faceted by experimental group (row) and subject
recommendation regarding approval (column). We can see that subjects in GOOD were very
unlikely to recommend rejection, whereas recommendations for rejection were fairly common among
subjects assigned to BAD. Few subjects in either group played the rational strategy of transferring
0 cents, except among those subjects in BAD that recommended rejection. For the BAD/reject
subjects, the modal transfer was 0 cents. Most GOOD subjects, as well as a large number of
subjects who recommended approval despite being in BAD, chose a more or less equitable split of
4 or 5 cents.
One result to note in Figure 4 in the GOOD/approval quadrant is how generous this distribution
is compared to the usual results of the dictator game. In most laboratory dictator games, transfers
of 0% or 50% of the endowment are common, with very few subjects transferring more than 50%
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(a) GOOD (y = 12) (b) BAD (y = 1)
Figure 3: Work evaluated by subjects in Experiment B
(Engel, 2010). Yet a clear majority of subjects in GOOD transferred amounts greater than 50% of
the endowment. This difference is probably due to the very low stakes used in the experiment.
4.1.1 Workers more likely to advocate no pay for low productivity work
Regressing an indicator for approval on the treatment indicator, we have:
approve = 0.418
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.064]
·GOOD + 0.500
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.056]
(3)
with n = 167 and R2 = 0.21. Confirming what was evident graphically, subjects in GOOD were
far more likely to recommend approval.
4.1.2 Workers rewarded good work with generous bonuses
Subjects were more generous to their highly productive peers. Regressing the amount transferred
on the treatment indicator, we have:
bonus = 1.442
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.393]
·GOOD + 3.488
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.298]
(4)
with n = 167 and R2 = 0.08.
4.1.3 Highly productive workers less generous and more likely to advocate rejection
There is a strong negative correlation between a subject’s own productivity and their generosity in
the dictator game:
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Figure 4: Experiment B, bonus allocation by treatment group and accept/reject recommendation.
Subjects in BAD evaluated work with 1 generic label, while subjects in GOOD evaluated work
with 12 specific and appropriate labels.
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Table 3: Experiment B summary statistics (n = 167)
Administrative
Launch: Sun Apr 11 04:36:25 GMT 2010
Finish: Mon Apr 12 12:39:20 GMT 2010
Survey FALSE TRUE % TRUE
male 70 97 58.1
from India 92 75 44.9
from US 118 49 29.3
motivated by money 41 126 75.4
Treatment Assignment
GOOD = 1 82 85 50.9
Recommended firm approve work
in GOOD 7 78 91.8
in BAD 41 41 50
Bonus to evaluated worker Min .25 Med. Mean .75 Max
in GOOD 0 4 5 4.929 6 9
in BAD 0 1 3 3.488 5 9
Notes: Overlap in subjects across experiments was |A ∩ B| = 15. Subjects in GOOD evaluated
work displaying 12 labels, while subjects in BAD evaluated work displaying only 1 label. The key
results from the experiments can be seen in the group proportion differences in the “Recommended
firm approve work” rows (in the %TRUE column) and the group mean differences in the “Bonus to
evaluated worker” rows.
bonus = −0.259
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.066]
·y + 5.376
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.365]
(5)
with n = 167 and R2 = 0.07. The effect also appears strongly in the approval recommendation:
approve = −0.055
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.011]
·y + 0.960
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.049]
(6)
with n = 167 and R2 = 0.11.
4.2 Discussion
The perceived quality of the evaluated work had a strong causal effect on measures of both punish-
ment and generosity. Subjects who evaluated low-output work were far more likely to recommend
rejection and transfer smaller amounts of money in the dictator game.10 The simplest explanation
10Greg Little et al. (2010) find that when MTurk workers evaluate the work product of others, they often use
readily available metrics such as quantity rather than quality.
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may be that workers believe that their evaluations themselves may be spot-checked, and thus it is
reasonable for them to adopt whatever they believe would be the principal’s view. In other words,
they reject poor work because they believe that the employer/requester is likely to be believe it is
bad. What is less clear is why highly productive workers are more likely to reject work. There are
at least three possible explanations:
• There are different “types” of workers, and highly productive types (measured by producing
high output on the initial image-labeling task) have a taste for punishment.
• Workers idiosyncratically differ in the perception of the prevailing productivity norm, and
these differences in norm perception determine both output choices and norm enforcement.
• Workers are inequity-averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and because they regard productivity
as costly, they punish low effort workers and reward high effort workers as a way to equalize
outcomes.
5 Experiment C: Productivity and punishment
By definition, one cannot experimentally manipulate “innate types.” However, if manipulations of
productivity cause a change in willingness to punish, then the innate types hypothesis is untenable.
To distinguish inequity aversion from norm enforcement, one would need a way of manipulating a
worker’s experienced productivity without changing either their perceptions of the prevailing norm
or their perceptions of each party’s payoffs. In the parlance of the treatment effects literature, the
exclusion restriction would need to be satisfied while not creating any non-random attrition. Given
our imperfect understanding of how workers make decisions about both labor supply and generosity,
it is unlikely that the exclusion restriction can be credibly satisfied. Nevertheless, ruling out the
innate types hypothesis is still worthwhile, which is the goal in Experiment C.
To illustrate the challenge of distinguishing among the hypotheses, consider the implications of
using the setup of Experiment A to induce changes in labor supply. In Experiment A we were able
to change output by altering the work sample shown to workers before they accepted the task. We
did not measure follow-on output in a second image-labeling task in Experiment A nor did we have
them evaluate others work, but if we had, at least two problems would arise. First, the manipulation
would have an effect on both the intensive margin and the extensive margin. Second, subjects who
quit in the first stage would not record their choices in the dictator game or their answer to the
accept/reject question.
The fundamental problem is that any intervention that changes worker pre-uptake beliefs about
the work required—and hence the labor supply on the extensive margin—is likely to create a missing
data problem. For this reason, the intervention used in Experiment C changes worker productivity
after subjects have already begun working. The design, as well as the failed pilots, will be discussed
in detail, but the key point is that the intervention successfully manipulated output on the intensive
margin and yet did not cause any across-group differences on the extensive margin (i.e., lead to
differences in group composition). However, it likely did affect perceived deservingness or inequity,
making it impossible to decide between the two hypotheses related to these concepts.
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5.1 Pilot experiments
Prior to running Experiment C, two failed pilot experiments were conducted. In the first pilot, half
of the subjects were assigned to work with an interface containing a hidden “bug” that introduced
a 1.2-second delay in the software execution after each label was added; those in the control faced
no delay. This pilot failed because it did not generate a “first stage” of reduced output—although
workers in the “slow” treatment took longer, they did not produce any less output. This outcome is
consistent with other findings that workers on MTurk appear insensitive to small time differences
(Horton and Chilton, 2010).
In the second pilot, subjects in the “slow” treatment received a pop-up box containing the
text “Thank you! Three is probably enough.” after they had added a second label but before
they added a third label. Although this treatment did have a large effect on worker productivity,
other aspects of the design of the experiment generated little variation in generosity. The first
problem was that in order to obtain a larger sample, the LOW work sample from Experiment A was
used, thereby compressing the productivity distribution (as in Experiment A). The second problem
was that workers evaluated work with 3 good labels. As a result, regardless of their treatment
assignment, many subjects chose the pseudo-50-50 (i.e., chose either the 4 or 5 cent transfer) split
and recommended approval, providing little useful variation in measurements of punishment and
generosity.
5.2 Actual experiment
After the two failed pilots, the second pop-up notice experiment was relaunched, albeit with two
modifications. The HIGH 9-label work sample from Experiment A served as the sample, and the
evaluated work was particularly bad—the evaluated worker provided only 1 generic label for an
item-rich photograph. Subjects were assigned to either NONE, in which they were given no notice,
or CURB, in which they received the pop-up notice after completing a second label. Because two-
stage least squares would be used in the data analysis, the total sample size was increased to 300.
Payment was 30 cents. Table 4 reports the summary statistics for experiment.
5.3 Results
Worker output at the image-labeling task is binned and then plotted as two bar charts in Figure
5. The top panel shows the bar chart for subjects in NONE, while the bottom shows CURB.
The bars themselves are filled in with the proportion of subjects in that band/group recommending
rejection or acceptance of the evaluated work. Several features of the data are readily apparent.
First, assignment to CURB dramatically reduced output: a large numbers of subjects in NONE
produced y ∈ (5, 10] or y ∈ (10, 30]. By comparison, less than 10 subjects total in CURB produced
this much. Second, subjects choosing high levels of productivity in NONE, they were far more
likely to recommend rejection. Although bonus allocation is not shown in the figure, this same
pattern appears—subjects with reduced productivity (those in CURB) were more generous in their
allocation of the 9 cents.
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Table 4: Experiment C summary statistics (n = 273)
Administrative
Launch: Sun Apr 18 19:36:44 GMT 2010
Finish: Wed Apr 21 05:18:02 GMT 2010
Survey FALSE TRUE % TRUE
male 117 156 57.1
from India 175 98 35.9
from US 162 111 40.7
motivated by money 80 193 70.7
Treatment Assignment
CURB = 1 133 140 51.3
Recommended we approve work?
in CURB 46 94 67.1
in NONE 57 76 57.1
Labels produced (y) Min .25 Med. Mean .75 Max
in CURB 1 2 3 2.979 4 10
in NONE 1 1 5 6.15 9 26
Bonus to evaluated worker
in CURB 0 2 4 3.871 5 9
in NONE 0 1 3 3.075 5 9
Notes: Overlap in subjects across experiments was |C ∩ B| = 20, |C ∩ A ∩ B| = 20. Subjects
in CURB reduced an output-reducing notification after adding a second label. The key results
from the experiment can be seen in the mean differences across groups (in the “Bonus to evaluated
worker” rows and the “Labels produced” rows).
5.3.1 Workers with reduced output more generous
There is a strong negative correlation between the amount transferred to the other player in the
dictator game and a subject’s own output in the image-labeling task, as shown by:
bonus = −0.207
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.039]
·y + 4.418
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.223]
(7)
with n = 273 and R2 = 0.12. Assignment to CURB had a strong, negative effect on worker output,
as shown by:
y = −3.172
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.490]
·CURB + 6.150
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.470]
(8)
with n = 273 and R2 = 0.14. The F-statistic for the model is 43.982. The two-stage least squares
estimate of the effect of output on transfers in the dictator game is:
bonus = −0.251
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.090]
·y + 4.619
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.433]
(9)
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There is no detectable difference between the OLS estimate of the effect of productivity on bonuses
and the two stage least-squares estimate.
5.3.2 Workers with reduced output less likely to punish
As in Experiment B, highly productive subjects were more likely to recommend that we not approve
the evaluated workers’ work:
approve = −0.042
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.005]
·y + 0.811
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.037]
(10)
with n = 273 and R2 = 0.13. The two-stage least squares estimate is:
approve = −0.032
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.017]
·y + 0.765
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.083]
(11)
which is not significantly different from the least-squares estimate.
5.4 Discussion
Experiment C rules out the possibility that productivity and generosity are jointly determined
by some innate worker “type”: reducing productivity reduced willingness to punish. However, the
experiment does not distinguish between the“enforced norms”hypothesis and the“inequity aversion”
hypothesis. The problem stems in part from the difficulty in manipulating worker productivity
without also altering workers’ perception of the relevant norm. It seems possible that future research
could disentangle these hypothesis with a suitable experimental design.
However, other experimental results probably push the balance of evidence towards the en-
forced norms hypothesis. First, more complex laboratory games such as those conducted by
Charness and Rabin (2002) show that workers trade off a number of competing interests when mak-
ing dictator game allocations and that preferences are more nuanced than simple inequity aversion.
List and Cherry (2008) make a compelling argument that what we often interpret as “social pref-
erences” in the dictator game is in fact a desire to be seen as complying with some context-specific
norm.
6 Experiment D: Peer effects from evaluation
Experiment A showed that exposure to employer-provided work samples affected labor supply, pre-
sumably by changing worker beliefs about the employer output expectations. Experiment D tested
whether work samples from peers that are not held up as examples can still influence productiv-
ity. In set-up, Experiment D was similar to Experiment B in that after an initial task, subjects
were assigned to one of two groups, GOOD and BAD. In GOOD, subjects evaluated a worker
that produced 11 labels; in BAD, subjects evaluated a worker that produced only 2 labels. Unlike
Experiment B, however, subjects performed an additional image-labeling task after the evaluation.
Table 5 reports the summary statistics for the experiment. The requested sample size was 300 and
payment was 40 cents.
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Groupings of output in the image−labeling task
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Figure 5: Output and punishment in Experiment C. This bar chart shows the amount of output
in different output bands and the percentage of subjects in that band recommending approval or
rejection. Note that a disproportionate number of subjects not receiving the output-curtailing
message (subjects in NONE) produced relatively high levels of output and that subjects in that
high-output band were much more likely to recommend rejection than low-output subjects.
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Table 5: Experiment D summary statistics (n = 275)
Administrative
Launch: Fri Apr 23 18:37:56 GMT 2010
Finish: Wed Apr 28 12:30:17 GMT 2010
Survey FALSE TRUE % TRUE
male 131 144 52.4
from India 177 98 35.6
from US 154 121 44
motivated by money 76 199 72.4
Treatment Assignment
GOOD = 1 142 133 48.4
Labels produced Min .25 Med. Mean .75 Max
Initial output, before evaluation (y1)
in GOOD 1 2 5 4.759 7 14
in BAD 1 2 5 4.768 7 15
Follow-on output, after evaluation (y2)
in GOOD 0 4 7 7.368 10 23
in BAD 0 1.25 5 5.014 7 16
Notes: Overlap in subjects across experiments was |D ∩C| = 26, |D ∩ (A∪B)∩C| = 37. Subjects
in GOOD evaluated high-output work, while subjects in BAD evaluated low-output work. The key
finding from this experiment was the effect exposure had on subsequent output. We can see that
there were no differences in output means pre-exposure (“Initial output, before evaluation” rows)
but a large difference after evaluation (“Follow-on output, after evaluation” rows).
6.1 Results
Exposure to the work of a peer strongly affected a subject’s subsequent output. Output following
exposure to highly productive peers was higher than output following exposure to less productive
peers. The treatment effect is heterogeneous across productivity distribution for the first task: more
productive workers are more strongly affected by the exposure to peers.
Most of the results can be readily seen in Figure 6, which shows scatter plots of final output, y2,
against initial output, y1. Observations from BAD are represented in the plot by a “+” symbol and
those in GOOD by a “o” symbol. The two panels contain the scatter plot and regression line for the
respective experimental group, as well as the points from the other group, lightly plotted. Because
only integer-level outputs were possible, all points are randomly perturbed to prevent over-plotting.
In the figure, the line for GOOD is both above and steeper than the regression line for BAD,
indicating non-constant effects.
21
6.1.1 Exposure to highly productive peers increased productivity
Subjects that evaluated highly productive work produced considerably more labels in the follow-on
task:
y2 = 0.914︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.071]
·y1 + 2.362︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.373]
·GOOD + 0.654
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.398]
(12)
with n = 275 and R2 = 0.49. In addition to the treatment effect, we can see that initial output was
highly correlated with subsequent output. The effect of GOOD was not, however, constant across
the initial output distribution:
y2 = 0.771︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.073]
·y1 + 0.317︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.142]
·y1GOOD + 0.850︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.799]
·GOOD + 1.337
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.411]
(13)
with n = 275 and R2 = 0.5; as y1 increases, the positive effect of assignment to GOOD on output
grows larger.
6.2 Discussion
The peer effects detected in Experiment D strongly depend upon a worker’s initial output. There
is no immediately obvious reason why this should be the case, however, studies from other domains
have also found that different types of workers respond differently to peers. One possible explanation
for the pattern is that initially less productive workers might already have strong beliefs that low
productivity is acceptable. Recall that subjects were exposed to the HIGH work sample from
Experiment A prior to accepting the task, and yet still chose to produce only 1 or 2 labels. Although
being in GOOD and observing highly productive work might still have some effect on their beliefs,
these less productive workers might have fairly stiff priors regarding what constitutes acceptable
work.
Although Experiment D demonstrated that exposure to peer output affects a worker’s own out-
put, it did not explain why workers are influenced by peers. There are several possible explanations
for why peer effects exist in this setting including fear of punishment, learning about relevant em-
ployer standards and perhaps even an innate desire to match the performance of peers, regardless
of the direct material payoff.
7 Experiment E: Peer effects after explicit employer in-
structions
Experiment D demonstrated the existence of productivity peer effects—even with the minimal
“interaction” created by evaluation, yet it did not explain why workers are affected by peers. If peer
effects reflect learning about employer standards, then clear, strongly stated production standards
should “inoculate” workers from learning-driven peer effects. However, if workers fear punishment
by fellow workers or if they have some innate desire to produce as much as peers, then we should
detect peer effects even when standards are clearly communicated.
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Figure 6: Subsequent output (y2) versus initial output (y1), by treatment group. All subjects did
an identical initial task and chose some number of labels to provide (shown on the x-axis). Subjects
then evaluated another subject’s work that demonstrated either low productivity (BAD, left panel)
or high productivity (GOOD, right panel). All points from each group are shown in each panel (as
well as the regression line), but the points and lines are either black or gray depending on whether
they came from the experiment group shown in the panel. All output levels are randomly perturbed
by ǫ ∼ U [−.2, .2] to prevent over-plotting (which would occur because only integer output levels
were possible).
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Figure 7: Mosaic plots showing the relationship between output in the initial task (y1) to output
in the follow-on task (y2). In Experiment E, all subjects were told to produce 2 and only 2 labels.
Subjects inOK then evaluated work showing 2 labels (hence complying with employer expectations),
while subjects in OVER evaluated work with 11 labels. In both plots, the unit square is split
vertically in thirds, in proportion to the number of subjects that selected y1 = 1, y1 = 2 and y1 ≥ 3,
respectively. Both plots are also split horizontally, in proportion to the number of subjects choosing
y2 = 1, y2 = 2 and y2 ≥ 3, respectively. The (y1 = 2, y2 = 2) block in OK is taller than the
corresponding block in OV ER, indicating that exposure to the complying work sample (in OK)
made initially complying workers (i.e., those choosing y1 = 2) more likely to comply in the follow
on task (i.e., choosing y2 = 2).
In Experiment E, these ideas were tested by providing subjects with very explicit instructions
about productivity expectations and then exposing subjects to peers. The set-up was almost iden-
tical to that of Experiment D, except that workers were told that they should produce 2 and only
2 labels per image. The requirement of 2 labels was stated before workers began the task, and
was repeated again with each of the two image-labeling tasks, directly above the image. After
performing the initial task, workers were assigned to one of two groups: OK, in which subjects
evaluated a work sample showing y = 2, and OV ER, in which subjects evaluated a work sample
showing y = 11. After evaluating the work, subjects performed an additional image-labeling task.
Table 6 shows the summary statistics for the experiment. The requested sample size was 300 and
the payment was 40 cents.
7.1 Results
The main results of Experiment E are readily apparent graphically, but the appropriate visualization
is somewhat more complex. We would like to see how the choice of y2 depended on y1 and the
assignment to OK or OV ER. Unfortunately, a scatter plot would be hard to interpret, as we
expect many subjects to choose y1 = 2 and y2 = 2, per the instructions. Much information would
be lost to over-plotting. A solution is to use a mosaic plot, which is useful for displaying relationships
between categorical data.
In Figure 7, the left panel shows a mosaic plot for OV ER, while the right panel shows same
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Table 6: Experiment E summary statistics (n = 272)
Administrative
Launch: Wed May 19 21:19:42 GMT 2010
Finish: Sun May 23 15:26:30 GMT 2010
Survey FALSE TRUE % TRUE
male 121 151 55.5
from India 136 136 50
from US 172 100 36.8
motivated by money 62 210 77.2
Treatment Assignment
OK = 1 141 131 48.2
Labels produced Min .25 Med. Mean .75 Max
Initial output, before evaluation (y1)
in OK 1 1 2 2.038 2 8
in OVER 1 1 2 2.085 2 8
Follow-on output, after evaluation (y2)
in OK 1 2 2 1.977 2 8
in OVER 1 2 2 2.667 3 14
Notes: Overlap in subjects across experiments was |E ∩ D| = 29, |E ∩ (A ∪ B ∪ C) ∩ D| = 42.
All subjects received explicit instructions to produce 2 labels. After performing one task, subjects
were assigned to OK, where they viewed complying work, or OV ER, where they viewed high-
output/non-complying work. The key finding from the experiment can be seen in difference in
group means in the “Follow on output, after evaluation” rows.
plot but for OK. Each pair-wise combination of output levels is represented by a rectangle. Output
levels are top-censored, creating three output groups: y = 1, y = 2 and y ≥ 3 (with 3+ as a label
for the final group). The width of each rectangle is proportional to the share of subjects that chose
that respective level of output for y1; the height on each rectangle is proportional to the number of
subjects that chose that level of output for y2.
Across both groups, most subjects chose y1 = 2, suggesting that employer instructions to produce
exactly 2 labels were salient. For subjects that complied initially, exposure to OK was associated
with a high level of compliance on the second task: only a tiny number of subjects increased or
decreased output, as indicated by the very short (y1 = 2, y2 = 1) and (y1 = 2, y2 = 3+) rectangles.
However, in OV ER, many subjects that chose y1 = 2 subsequently increased their output level after
evaluating the 11 label image, as seen by the tall rectangles associated with y2 = 3+ in OV ER.
7.1.1 Most workers compliant with employer output requests
In both OV ER and OK, we can see that y1 = 2 was by far the most common output choice.
Reassuringly, Figure 7 shows that the breakdown of y1 appears almost identical across the two
treatments. This is expected since subjects were randomized and the experience of the groups
did not differ until after the first task was completed. The instruction to produce only two labels
appears salient, especially considering the first stage was identical to that of this experiment that
in Experiment A, LOW (Figure 2, bottom panel), except that no explicit instructions were given,
and in the Experiment A case, y = 2 was not the modal choice, as it was in Experiment E.
7.1.2 Language barriers likely prevented full initial compliance
Although not causal, a regression of the compliance indicator on self-reported country suggests that
language barriers might have limited compliance, with subjects from India significantly less likely
to comply:
1{y2 = 2} = −0.228
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.059]
·INDIA+ 0.691
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.040]
(14)
with n = 272 and R2 = 0.05.
7.1.3 Evaluating compliant work increased compliance for initially complying workers
Being assigned to OK strongly increased y2-compliance:
1{y2 = 2} = 0.161︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.059]
·OK + 0.504
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.042]
(15)
with n = 272 and R2 = 0.03. This effect is driven by subjects in OK who initially complied and then
continued to comply on the second image. This is evidenced by the large and significant coefficient
on the compliance × assignment interaction:
1{y2 = 2} = 0.022︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.083]
·OK + 0.205
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.102]
· [OK × 1{y1 = 2}] + 0.467︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.076]
·1{y1 = 2}+ 0.242︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.055]
(16)
with n = 272 and R2 = 0.36. Note that exposure to OK has no effect for originally non-complying
workers who chose y1 6= 2. Also note that initial compliance was strongly predictive of subsequent
compliance.
7.1.4 Workers did not punish non-complying work that demonstrated high effort
Assignment to OK had no effect on subjects’ accept/reject recommendations:
approve = −0.002
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.041]
·OK + 0.872
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.028]
(17)
with n = 272 and R2 = 0. For transfers in the dictator game:
bonus = −0.397
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.263]
·OK + 5.305
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.182]
(18)
with n = 272 and R2 = 0.01. Note that the bonus level itself was quite high, and most subjects
transferred a more than equitable split. Given the strong positive correlation between subjects’
26
own productivity and self-serving behavior in the dictator game, the large average bonus size is
consistent with the fact that most subjects showed low productivity on the initial task (because
they were induced to choose y1 = 2). Although the coefficient on OK in the regression above is
not significant, it is not a precisely estimated zero, as in the case of approval in Equation 17. Self-
serving behavior among subjects assigned to OK is concentrated among highly productive types
evaluating the 2-label evaluated work. We can see this by the large negative coefficient on the
group/productivity (y1 × OK) interaction term:
bonus = 0.720
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.502]
·OK + 0.020
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.152]
·y1 +−0.547
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.204]
·y1 × OK + 5.264︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.383]
(19)
with n = 272 and R2 = 0.05.
7.1.5 Exposure to highly productive work increased output even when expectations
were explicit
Workers exposed to OV ER increased their output compared to those exposed to OK:
y2 = 0.658︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.120]
·y1 +−0.659
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.183]
·OK + 1.294
︸ ︷︷ ︸
[0.299]
(20)
with n = 272 and R2 = 0.25. However, unlike in Experiment D, this effect was not conditional
upon initial output. When the regression above is augmented with an y1 ·OK interaction term (not
shown), the coefficient on the interaction is small and insignificant, which is consistent with there
being little variation in initial output (i.e., the distribution of y1 is heavily concentrated at y1 = 2).
7.2 Discussion
It is clear that many workers take explicit requests from employers as informative and worth com-
plying with. Yet a substantial number of workers remained susceptible to peer effects that could, in
principle, have led them to have their work rejected for not following the letter of the instructions.
There are several possible explanations.
One possibility is mistake. Workers might believe that they misinterpreted the instructions
or that other workers have some inside knowledge. Workers might reasonably believe that we
had free disposal of extra labels and added a few more to provide a margin of safety. However,
the requirement was clearly stated at least three times to workers, and many initially complying
workers were still pulled upward by highly productive peers.
Another possibility is that workers want to produce an amount comparable to that of their peers,
regardless of employer instructions. Given the propensity of peers to punish low effort, matching the
output of one’s peers is a good idea if there is a chance one will be evaluated by those peers. Because
subjects are asked to evaluate workers, it seems likely that they infer they will also be evaluated by
other workers. Given that other workers are likely to reward or punish based on apparent effort,
not necessarily on compliance with the stated standards, above-standard output could be rational
even if it is technically non-complying.
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8 Conclusion
This paper reports a number of results on punishment, productivity and peer effects: (1) workers
readily punish low-effort work; (2) workers are susceptible to peer effects, but the effects are con-
ditional upon a worker’s productivity; (3) a worker’s willing to punish is mediated by their own
productivity, which is in turn malleable; (4) workers punish low effort, not failure to comply with
an employer’s instructions. Some of these findings contradict or at least complicate results from
other workplace settings. Future research should investigate the generalizability of these findings
and which should clarify which findings are general features of how humans think about work and
which are context-specific.
If strong reciprocity is a general feature of human organizations, then a natural question for
managers is whether they should encourage this phenomenon among workers. Here, context seems
to matter greatly. Giving workers thicker sticks or juicier carrots to use on their peers may backfire
if workers are enforcing norms contrary to the best interests of the firm. Further, other research has
shown that workers will enforce norms that are directly counter productive (e.g., Roy’s 1952 work
on machine shops). Creating the tools for norm enforcement is risky when knowledge of what will
be enforced is murky.
A key theme of these experiments is the apparent pliability of productivity, which highlights the
danger of what might be called “organizational alchemy,” i.e., the attempt to harness the power of
peer effects without knowing how they work in the relevant context. For example, in contrast to
several other findings, “bad” workers did not improve after evaluating good work. At least in the
context examined, it would be a mistake to mix workers of different abilities with the hope that the
good would raise the bad.
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